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Politische Orientierung Jugendlicher - Unterschiede zwischen
Links und Rechts ins Israel
The distinction between political left and right has been blurred through the years
in western countries andprobably more so in Israel. Using a nationalrandom samp¬
le ofhigh school students, this study is an investigation ofwhich political attitudes
dbtinguish between right and left in Israel. In addition, the influence ofreligiosity
and socioeconomic Status on political identification was explored.
Thefindings show that right and left attitudes are demonstratedin diametrically oppo¬
site ways with reference the extent ofland compromises that should be made with
the Arab countries. The morepositively one scores on religiosity scale the stronger
the identification with the right. On the other hand, despite the leftis claim ofbeing
pro labor and the Champion ofthe working classes, it appears that the lower the
socio-economic Status the stronger the identification with the right rather than, as
might have been expected, the left. The imphcation ofthefindings are discussed.
Der Unterschied zwischen politisch linken undpolitisch rechten Orientierungen ist
in den meisten westlichen Ländern, besonders in Israel, in den letzten Jahren unklar
geworden. In dieser Studie werden aufder Basis einer Zufallstichprobe von Schü¬
lerinnen und Schülern der Oberstufepolitische Einstellungsunterschiede herausge¬
arbeitet. Zusätzlich wird der Einfluss religiöser Orientierungen und der sozioöko¬
nomische Status auf die politische Orientierung in Israel untersucht. Ergebnbse
zeigen, dass Unterschiedezwischen linken undrechten Einstellungen vor allem Blick
auf territoriale Kompromisse gegenüber den arabischen Ländern bestehen. Auch
Religiosität hat einen starken Einfluss, indem sie direkt mit der politischen Rechts¬
orientierung zusammenhängt. Je niedriger der sozioökonomische Status, desto stär¬
ker ist die Identifizierung mit der politischen Rechten. Diese Tendenz ist auffällig,
weil die politische Linke sich intensiv um die Zustimmung von sozial benachteilig¬
ten Gruppen bemüht. Die Implikationen der Untersuchungsergebnisse werden aus¬
führlich diskutiert.
Left and Right in Israel
The concepts of left and right, liberal and conservative are widely used to denote
individualsi political orientations. Over the years the meaning ofthese terms has
become confusing when exarnining the political platform ofeach political camp.
In the first part ofthis paper we place in historical context social changes in the
Israeli society that have brought about a convergence of ideas in the two major
opposing political camps and look at what remains of the concepts of left and
right. Next, we empirically study how adolescents in Israel today perceive these
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concepts. Finally we show how religiosity, socio-economic Status, and altruistic
orientation are associated with attitudes that support the left and right.
It might be of interest to notice that this study is conducted in a broader re¬
search context of a national youth survey which is conducted by the Minerva
Center for Youth Studies in Israel. The study will enable us, in the future, to
compare, among other things, the changes in the attitudes ofyoung people con¬
cerning political issues, their religious orientation and attitudes toward peace
in the light of important political changes that have been taking place in the
country such as government change, and progress in the peace process.
From the time that the State ofIsrael was established until the mid 70s, the con¬
cept of left and right had connotations and social meaning that were compa-
tible with what used to be assumed when referring to political left and right in
all western democracies.
The Israeli left was socialist by ideology, a devout supporter of trade unions,
and committed to a socialist life style. For many years the political elite was
drafted from the kibbutz movement. The medical system was inexpensive and
accessible to all through insurance plans that had been subsidized by the dif¬
ferent labor governments since the establishment ofthe State until 1977 (Alka¬
na, 1991; Diskin, 1988; Etzioni-Halevy, 1997; Shapiro, 1996; Shiloah, 1991;
Ventora & Shamir, 1991; Yatziv 1979).
The economic development was based on heavy State intervention. Most ofthe
major industrial and service sectors had been monopolistic and were State owned.
The major industries were established by State investments or incentives for part-
nership with private entrepreneurs. Either way the State maintained its control by
being the major share holderand through regulatory legislation in favor ofgovern¬
ment owned or supported ventures. Undoubtedly this came at a heavy cost with
regard to efficiency, but at the same time unemployment was kept relatively low
and balance sheet considerations were not driving the economic decisions.
Furthermore, for many years the State of Israel managed to keep the gap be¬
tween rieh and poor very narrow through progressive high taxation. Also the
prices were kept depressed due to heavy subsidies for essential consumer goods
such as: food (basic produets), Utilities (electricity and water), transportation,
education, and health. That is part ofa social ideology that strove for the con¬
solidation ofa welfare State and the realization ofthe belief in social equality.
This put the government in a very strong parenting position, and its involve¬
ment in every sphere oflife was very noticeable. The toll has been being govern-
ed by the stifling tyranny ofthe bureaucrats in addition to professional incom¬
petence and inefficiency (Alkana, 1991; Yatziv 1979).
A sudden economic boom, following the Six day War, brought about a rapid
growth ofthe private sector because the public sector was unable to fulfill the
needs ofthe expanding economy. Also, foreign investors realized that govern¬
mental controls were too limiting and demanded a hands off policy with less
bureaucratic intervention. In 1977, there was a dramatic change in government
in Israel when the leading party of 30 years, the labor party, lost the elections.
Since then, the Likud, which is perceived predominantly as national demoera-
tic in its political orientation and liberal in its economic orientation (libera-
lization over foreign currency control as an example) has been (with a 4 year
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intermission) a dominant party in Israeli politics. The new trend can be seen
in: sales of government companies, monetary tax controls, and a shift from
government ownership to private and public ownership ofmajor industries and
Services, such as telecommunication and the postal office (Diskin, 1988; Etzio-
ni-Halevy, 1997; Shapiro 1996; Ventora & Shamir, 1991).
Icons that were symbols ofthe old ideology and bastions ofthe previous elite
were demolished. There were massive attacks on the Kibbutz movement that
tried to portray the kibbutz members as unproductive, lazy and hedonistic (Kanz¬
ler, 1984). This attempt to destroy national myths was made to establish a new
social and economic order, that is, a set ofnew priorities and a new social and
economic agenda.
The irony, ofcourse, is that the social democratic values ofthe Labor party had
been on the decline for a decade before the Likud came to power, and the issue
of economic ideology apparently was hardly a divisive issue between the two
political blocks. Clearly there is a convergence toward the center, which sug¬
gests a moderate form ofCapitalism with some social responsibility still being
expected ofthe State. However the füll fledged welfare State is quickly becom¬
ing a fading dream for those who still see in the State an entity that ought to
bring about social equality, job opportunities, and ensure a minimal Standard
of living and care.
Although the content changes, the labeis remain. The terms Left and Right in
Israel are associated with the two big parties and their satellites but, now, as a
political rather than a socio ideological concept. While, the left in Israel pre¬
sents itself as social democratic in its social and economic outlook, the Likud
is perceived as more conservative in its social views and prefers minimization
of State intervention as a rule. However these differences are nuances rather
than clear splits between competing ideologies (Goldberg 1992).
On the other hand, the political ideology ofthe right vs. the left has been very
clear and untainted. The differences are mostly manifested in a hard line the
right takes against the Palestinians and the whole peace process, while the left
is considered more liberal, more willing to give up and give back land to the
Palestinians (Diskin, 1980; Doron, 1996; Etzioni-Halevi & Shapiro, 1977; Gil-
lon, 1990; Golan, 1984; Goldberg, 1992; Shamir, 1986a; Sprinzak, 1995; Tal-
mod, 1985; Ventora & Shamir, 1991).
Even before the reconciliation process started in Oslo in 1993, the difference
between the Israeli right and left has been that the right underlined the right of
Jews to settle in all the area west of the Jordan river. They refused to accept
and recognize the rights of Palestinians to a State or to a political entity that is
distinguished as separate from Israel. The left, on the other hand, exhibited a
variety of views all ofwhich acknowledged the existence ofa Palestinian peo¬
ple, and some also supported the Palestinian expectations that at the end ofthe
process there would be a Palestinian State (Goldberg 1992; Harkabi, 1994; Kanz¬
ler, 1984; Peri & Goldberg, 1985).
Now that there is already wide acceptance, in both camps, ofthe principles of
the Oslo agreement, it appears that the differences focus on minute issues that
have more to do with form than with substance. The right exhibits less enthu-
siasm and trust towards the Palestinian counterparts and expresses it by being
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tough negotiators and stopping the process at any excuse. The left, on the other
hand, is supportive ofdeveloping more trust and good will between the two sides
and is more optimistic about the possibüity of a successful completion of the
process (Harkabi, 1994). The difference todaybetween the two main parties ,Labor
and Likud, however, is more semantic than Substantive. It is clear to everyone
that a Palestinian State is an unavoidable development, and it is the vision ofthe
future and the shape ofthat State that might still separate the left from the right.
Our study tries to identify what differentiates between left and right, and what
constitutes left as opposed to right. In addition we wanted to determine whether
religiosity and socio economic Status influence the political identification ofado¬
lescents. The logic in looking for such connection is not unique to Israel. In many
countries in the western world poverty and right wing orientation has been almost
an unavoidable tie. While traditionally socialists and liberals were drawn from
the more privileged and educated social strata, the unemployed, the poor and
those generally ranked low on the socio- economic scale have been the source
for mobilization for the ultra right, conservative and nationalistic movements,
recent examples of it are seen today in England, France Germany and the US.
American studies have shown that the influence ofthe Christian right is higher
among the elderly, the less educated, and the economically insecure. They tend
to vote for the Republican party (Regnerus, M.D, et al., 1999). Such affiliation
which also draws on feelings ofxenophobia gives a sense ofbelonging and Chan¬
nels the feelings of frustration into political radicalism.
In Israel much ofthe support for the right comes from such elements who gene¬
rally are less educated, have lower income, and many reside in the periphery.
Much oftheir political conviction is associated with feelings ofhostility and suspi-
cion against the Arabs and any reconciliation attempt between Jews and Arabs.
Religiosity ties into it in a very peculiar way. On the one hand many ofthe lower
class Jews are of a religious-traditional background. In addition, the political
struggle between Jews and Palestinians has taken a religious twist. The Israeli
ultra right is associated with the nationalist religious elements who considered
the settlement ofthe whole ofPalestine as a religious commandment. They have
become the pushing force in the previous right wing government in refusing to
make any progress in the peace process and were the catalyst in heightening inter¬
nal conflicts over removal of Settlements within the Israeli public. The fact that
religiosity is associated with nationalism and right wing politics makes the asso¬
ciation also of low socio-economic Status almost a default Option.
Data and Methods
A stratified random sample of 360 classes in 150 schools all over Israel was
drawn from a list of all 9-12 grades with each class level representing a strata,
in academic schools under the supervision of the ministry of education. The
list did not include the parochial schools of the ultra orthodox sector and the
vocational schools. Data, for the original and comprehensive study, were collect¬
ed in 1997 by asking all students in each class to fill out a questionnaire. Of
the 12,343 students sampled, 395 returned questionnaires that were unreliable
because of omitted or inconsistent responses and needed to be discarded. The
group that was discarded did not show unique characteristics and was similar
in its demographic characteristics to the selected sample. How-ever, due to the
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method ofdata collection, that will be described next, the sample that was rele¬
vant for our analysis shrunk by close to 50%.
The method used to collect the data was a split half design. Two versions of
the questionnaire were designed, and they were distributed at random in the
various classes. There was a core of questions that appeared in both versions,
but to keep the questionnaire manageable, and thus as short as possible, each
ofthe split halves included also different questions in addition to the core ques¬
tions that were identical. In this particular study the sample consists of only
6017 respondents (about half ofthe total study population), those who were
given one ofthe split halves which included questionnaires that focused, among
other things, on political attitudes.
The questionnaire was very structured and was administered by trained uni¬
versity students who were ready to answer any questions that were raised.
Dependent variables: First we wanted to identify the characteristics of "left"
and "right" in Israel. Leftist orientation was determined according to the answer
to the following items: on a scale of 1-5, to what degree do you identify with
the ideas ofthe Labor party; to what degree do you identify with the ideas of
the parties on the left spectrum of the political scene. In addition questions
were asked about the peace process with the Palestinians. A strong support was
coded 4 and disagreement was coded 1. The questions were: how do you feel
about allowing the Palestinians to establish an independent State; do you agree
that the peace process should continue even though terrorist activities contin¬
ue; how much should Israel give up in the Golan for peace with Syria; to what
extent is it necessary to evacuate Settlements in the West Bank; if there is peace,
is there a possibüity that East Jerusalem will be under Palestinian control; if
the government decides to evacuate Settlements should the settlers cooperate
with the government with no resistance.
All these variables were subjected to a confirmatory factor analysis, all the varia¬
bles had a high factor loading and the scale had high reliability score (a=.84).
Table 1: Identification with the Left - a component matrix
variables factor
loading
identify with labor .770
identify with left wing ideology .804
agree to a Palestinian independent State .709
make concessions in the Golan for peace with Syria .786
if necessary for peace, remove Settlements in the west bank .732
willing to divide Jerusalem for the sake of peace .573
continue the peace process despite terrorist attacks .610
if Settlements are removed the settlers should not resist .503
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To identify the Israeli Right we asked the following questions: to what degree
do you identify with the ideology of the Likud party: to what extent do you
identify with the ideology ofthe right wing parties; to what extent do you iden¬
tify with the ideology ofthe religious parties; to what extent do you identify
with the ideology ofthe extreme right. In addition the same questions regard¬
ing peace policy that were asked ofthe left were also asked ofthe right, how¬
ever the direction ofthe coding was changed so that 4 was strongly disagree,
and 1 strongly agree.
The confirmatory factor analysis showed that those with a positive loading on
identification with the right also had positive loading on the various variables
that check their objection to concessions and compromise . The scale showed
high reliability as well (a=.83). Thus we can suggest that we have not only
identified supporters of left and right parties, but also the Substantive divisive
line in the Israeli politics.
Table 2: Identification with the Right - a component matrix
variables factor loading
identify with the Likud party .782
identities with the Israeli right .793
identities with clerical parties .692
identifies with extreme right groups .640
opposing to allow a Palestinian State .656
against concessions in the Golan .718
opposing any removal of Settlements .716
Jerusalem will not be divided .516
stop peace process if terrorist activities occur .594
settlers should oppose actively to removal .512
Independent variables: Fatheris education, was measured by years of school¬
ing. Family income was measured by a seif evaluation of whether one is fami¬
ly income is above, at, or below the national mean income. In addition, we
have created three composite variables through factor analysis, one was reli¬
giosity was composed of 8 items: to what extent does prayer affect things, to
what extent can the spirit ofa "holy man" be effective also after his death. Can
a contemporary "holy man" help other people; how probable is the Coming of
the messiah in your life time; is it probable that the messiah will come in the
distant future; how likely is it that, in the future, you will study in a religious
institution or a Yeshiva. The alpha reliability ofthe scale was.90. Satisfaction
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with the government functioning consisted of 2 questions: how satisfied are
you with the functioning of the parliament, and of the government of Israel
(a=.61). Altruism was composed of 6 items checking the wülingness ofa per¬
son to contribute to society; to what extent is it important to you to be an honest
person, a law abiding Citizen, loyal to your friends, to empathize with others,
and to contribute to the society you live in, (a=.79).
Findings
Sample characteristics
Each class-strata was differentially represented, grade 9 constituted 24.7% of
the sample, grade 10, 26.5%, grade 11- 27.1% and grade 12- 20.9%. The sam¬
ple consisted of45% boys and 55% girls. The majority ofthe students (83.2%)
were Jewish and the rest Arabs, however this particular analysis pertains only
to the Jewish population. The family income had an interesting distribution,
41.6% claimed that their family income corresponds to the national average
and 47.8% said that their family income was above average, out ofthem 17.6
said that it was much above average. Only 10.7% reported below average in¬
come. The level of schooling for the parents was above 12 years for both fa¬
thers and mothers, and 12% identified themselves as religious, 51% as tradition¬
al and 37% as secular. The data show that in our sample the percentage ofyouth
identifying with the right and the left is very similar, 47% and 53% respec¬
tively. At the moment it seems that although the youth participating in the sur¬
vey have not reached the voting age, their political preferences in general exhi-
bit the same pattern that emerged in the general elections in Israel ofMay 1999.
Multivariate Analysis
Next we tried to explore what predicts the belonging to the Israeli left or to the
right. For that purpose we used a multiple regression analysis. Looking at what
is related to the identification with the left, as Table 3 suggests, all 5 indepen¬
dent variables were statistically significant. However, only religiosity and satis¬
faction with government had a high beta and these variables had a negative
sign which means, that religiosity is negatively associated with identification
with the left, and apparently those associated with the left do not show much
appreciation for the functioning of the government.
An interesting finding was the relationship between socio-economic Status and
identification with the left. The effect of fatheris education and income was
small but positive and statistically significant, indicating that the higher the
socio-economic Status the higher the identification with the left. In sum, it
appears that adolescents expressing identification with the left are from rela¬
tively wealthier and more secular families, are less satisfied with government
action, and believe that individuals should contribute to their society.
Looking at the regression when the dependent variable is identification with
the right shows the opposite picture. The religiosity and satisfaction with govern¬
ment had a positive value and they were the most significant variables (ß =.46,
and .36 respectively). The effect of socio-economic Status was negative. Fat¬
heris education and family income was negatively related to identification with
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the right. This was also the case with the altruism variable. Both modeis account
for considerable variance (see Table 3).
Table 3: Multiple Regression for Left and Right
Dependent variable: Left Dependent variable: Right
variables B Std. Error ß B Std. Error P
Constant -.655 .420
Altruism .0938*** .015 .089 -.0845*** .014 -.081
Religiosity -.417*** .016 -.411 .466*** .015 .462
family income .0862*** .015 .079 -.0453*** .014 -.042
satisf. With
government
-.315*** .015 -.311 .364*** .014 .361
father's educ. .0207*** .004 .068 -.0165*** .004 -.054
R' .395 .482
p<o.oor p<o.or P< 0.05*
The results ofthe regression analysis clearly indicate that religiosity is a very
important component in the political identification of adolescents. Therefore,
we were interested in exploring what variables predict a religious orientation.
There was no point in including the effect of political participation because
this variable alone was closely related to religiosity, as we learned from the
effects of religiosity on political participation (see Table 3) and its inclusion
would make the argument more statistically significant but circular. Thus, the
independent variables included altruism, family income, and fatheris educa¬
tion and ethnic origin (Sephardic or non-Sephardic) . The results in Table 4
Table 4: Multiple Regression effect of on Religiosity
variables B Std. Error ß
Constant 1.070 .091
Altruism .219* .016 .210
family income -.104* .017 -.097
satisf. With government .282* .015 .281
father's educ. -.056* .005 -.183
Sephardic .426* .037 .181
adjusted Rz .266
*
P< 0.001
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show that the total explained variance is close to 27 percent (R2=27) (it would
have been .39 and .43 if we had also included the identification with the left
and right ideologies, respectfully). However, interesting trends are revealed.
Religiosity was positively associated with satisfaction with government func¬
tioning, with being of Sephardic descent, and with having altruistic feelings.
On the other hand, religiosity is negatively associated with family income and,
fatheris education. This means that religiosity is related to lower SES.
Discussion
From the way the variables "identification with the right" and "identification
with the left" were constructed through factor analysis it is clear that two dia-
metrically opposite ideologies are represented. What characterizes the right?
Besides claiming the identification with certain right parties, it also was asso¬
ciated with: Opposition to establishing a Palestinian State, objection to remov-
ing Jewish Settlements in the West Bank, Opposition to the division of Jerusa¬
lem, Opposition to concessions in the Golan Heights, condition the continua-
tion of the peace process to stopping terrorist activities, and justification of
active resistance to any attempt to remove settlers from the West Bank. All in
all, the findings draw a very stereotypical picture ofthe right which fits much
more the extreme right, and also perhaps the slogans of the more moderate
right. In reality, there is a much more pragmatic and sober approach that recog-
nizes the limitations and political reality. Thus, the need for territorial con¬
cessions in the west Bank and the Golan are realized but are not manifested
formally in the political platform ofthe right wing leading party. Actually many
ofthe declarations made, especially during the election campaign (and this paper
has been written a few weeks before the general elections of 1999 so that the
rhetoric was very obvious) are more radical and non-compromising than the
actual policies ofthe current right wing government that is about to step down
following the 1999 election results. Furthermore, while making slogans and
formal declarations, the Likud party leaders also point out that the next govern¬
ment, if they win the elections, will be a coalition government with the Labor
and the new Center party. Such a Statement can only mean moderation and
wülingness to continue the peace process. This really means, and it is very trans¬
parent in the Israeli political context, wülingness to compromise over land
issues and perhaps even a realization that a Palestinian State is an inevitable
result ofthe process.
On the other hand, identification with the left entails a very dovish approach
that includes an acceptance of a Palestinian State, compromises in the Golan,
wülingness to use force to remove settlers from the West Bank, separating ter-
rorism and bombing from the peace process, and füll commitment to the con-
tinuation ofthe peace process almost at any cost. In addition there is an agree-
ment among the left respondents that for the sake of peace, it is conceivable
that Jerusalem could be divided. This Statement is in contradiction with all offi¬
cial Statements that the Labor party has been making. At the leadership level
there is a declared national consensus that Jerusalem will never be divided again,
but the reality and attitudes ofthe supporters ofthe left seem to be more prag¬
matic and to deviate from the formal party line. Generalizing from the find¬
ings, one can conclude that although the leaders ofthe Likud today use rhetoric
that might be interpreted as less extreme, their constituents are more extreme in
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their expressed attitudes. We tend to attach special meaning to this because the
survey was done long before the election and its extremist rhetoric even start¬
ed, therefore, the responses are even more credible. The left, on the other hand,
is more moderate and willing to compromise than the formal position adopted
by the Labor party leadership. Hence although there is some convergence in
the leadership positions, the gap is wide among the grass roots supporters of
each side.
Our findings also suggest that the left and right division is identified along two
axes, the religious and the socio-economic. Religiosity has been the variable
that explains the most variance of party identification in the right and the left.
And inversely, the Single most significant variable to account for religiosity
has been party identification. The right is positively and the left is negatively
associated with religiosity. This finding brings us back to the traditional diffe¬
rences between the left and right parties in Israel in the early years of state-
hood. The left was traditionally socialist, cosmopolitan, and secular. The ear¬
ly elite ofthe Labor party were Kibbutz members who were totally secular and
demonstratively anti-religious. They created new meanings for traditional holi-
days and opposed almost any external Symbol of Jewish religiosity. The right,
on the other hand, in addition to its nationalistic orientation was never anti-reli¬
gious, and many of its supporters were very traditional if not religious in ori¬
entation (Arian 1997, Goldberg 1992).
As the political divisions crystallized along the lines of relationships with the
Palestinians and the attitudes toward the peace process, the right aligned itself
along extreme nationalistic lines, which were in high concordance with reli¬
gious nationalistic views. From here it was only a short way to become allies
also with other non-Zionist religious groups who perceived the left as secular
and hostile to religion and the right, especially the Likud, as a political element
that is more favorable to it. Hence the political alliance between the right and
its nationalistic agenda with the religious parties (nationalistic and non-Zio¬
nist alike).
Although the convergence between right and left on economic issues and the
role of the State has minimized significantly, it is still a drum to beat during
election campaigns, but the reality is that changes in governments produce mini¬
mal policy changes, and the changes are mostly a result ofthe government caving
in to demands by various supporting sectors rather than due to ideologically
driven policy.
From the regression designed to explain political identification we see that the
two socio-economic variables that associate with political identification , i.e.,
family income, and fatheris education, are negatively associated with identifi¬
cation with the right and positively associated with identification with the left.
This all means that the lower the famüy income and the lower the fatheris edu¬
cation, the stronger the identification with the right. Stronger identification
with the left occurs when there is a higher the income, and a higher fatheris
education.
The negative relationship between socio-economic relations and religiosity clear¬
ly indicates that the higher one scores on religiosity the lower the income and
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the less the fatheris education. In other words poverty, rather than affluence is
more closely related to religiosity. This finding did not depend on the respon-
dentsi political identification. In short, lower Status people are more religious
and also tend to identify with the right. Supporters of the left are more afflu-
ent, and less religious. But among people those identify with the left, the lower
the SES the more likely the person is to be religious regardless ofthe political
identification.
Our findings might seem to be unique to Israel and to its geo-political context.
The relationship between religiosity and political right might be construed as
associated to the religious dictate to inhabit the land of the for fathers. How¬
ever the intensity of the political discourse and the politization of reügion in
Israel might leave us with a very misleading impression. The alliance between
religious forces and political conservatism is noticeable in most societies in
the western world. Religiosity and political preference are, to a large extent a
manifestation of social attitudes (Brooks, C. and J. Manza, 1997). However
these attitudes reflect some very fundamental set of social values from which
the religious intensity and the political preferences emerge. A hint to the vali¬
dity ofsuch a thesis might be the fact that a scale ofaltruism that was develop¬
ed for this study is clearly associated with what is defined as political left in
Israel and negatively correlated with the right.
Political and religious manifestation are context relevant, therefore what is con¬
sidered leftist issues in Germany or Britain might not apply in Israel where the
issue of the peace process is the dominant issue of political discourse, how¬
ever it is very likely that a person holding left oriented ideas in Israel will adopt
also left oriented ideas in another culture (regardless of how it is defined or
manifested in the respective culture), and the same is true about one who is
defined as a right winger. The reason for that might be that such identifica¬
tion draw on fundamentally diverse values that further studies of comparative
political socialization should try and answer.
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